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Over the last two decades the study of the development of retail organisations has moved 
from being relatively under-researched into the mainstream of business history and 
management studies.  That this has been the case is due, in part, to the recognition by some 
prominent retailers in Britain and elsewhere of the value of archival records both within their 
organisations and as a wider cultural and historical resource.  At a time when ‘corporate 
responsibility’ is becoming an increasingly important buzz-phrase, the idea that keeping 
business archives can not only provide practical evidence to support reputational claims, but 
is in itself a practical example of corporate responsibility is particularly welcome.  One of the 
most prominent examples is the Sainsbury Archive, which has been preserved for posterity 
through the setting up of an independent charitable trust funded jointly by the parent business 
and the Sainsbury family and made accessible at a purpose-equipped study centre located at 
the Museum in Docklands, which is part of the Museum of London.  The focus of this article 
is on the value of a part of the collection – records of sales – to researchers, and in particular 
how these have been used to shed light on Sainsbury’s postwar transformation from a 
medium-sized regional operator of small provisions shops to become, by the early 1970s, the 
yardstick by which the supermarket industry measured itself.  The paper falls into two parts: 
firstly an examination of the types of sales records that are available
2, and secondly a 
summary of the preliminary results obtained from analysing sales data and associated sources 
which relate to the period 1947-75. 
 
Sales are, of course, the life-blood of every business, but they are retailers’ raison d’être.  
They are the mechanism by which the value of shop space is measured, the chief tool for 
assessing employees’ performance and the determinant of managers’ promotion prospects.  
Until the advent of computers, a small army of head office clerks was employed by 
Sainsbury’s in tabulating and analysing the raw data which each branch recorded.  The ‘sales 
office’ was at the opposite end of the company’s fourth floor offices from the chairman’s 
                                                            
1 This article is forthcoming in Business Archives: Sources and History (November, 2008). It is based on 
research carried out with assistance from the Business Archives Council’s Business History Bursary 2006.  I’d 
also like to express my particular thanks to Clare Wood, the Sainsbury Archivist, and to Professor Andrew 
Godley.(Reading CIBH). 
2 References to catalogue codes were correct at Oct 2007, but may be revised as a result of an on-going revision   3
suite, and it’s said that the delivery of the collated figures was marked by a weekly parade 
from one end of the building to the other.  But the esteem in which these records were held at 
the time is belied by the paucity of published information.  As a private limited company 
whose articles of association restricted share ownership to members of the founding family, 
the company’s  Annual Reports from 1949 contained the minimal information required by the 
1948 Companies Act, and did not, until 1968, include turnover figures. Researchers are 
therefore likely to be surprised by the richness of internal record-keeping preserved in the 
Sainsbury Archive.  At the core of the surviving sales records is a series of ledgers which 
give weekly sales figures for every Sainsbury’s branch from 1911 until 1979
3.  The records 
are arranged into the firm’s supervisory districts; later volumes also group stores by type, 
branch number (the unique number allotted to each store in the late 1940s to facilitate the use 
of Powers-Samas punched-card branch accounting) and department.  Thus these documents 
contain, in addition to statistical data, a significant subtext of management information.     
There is also, for the earlier period, a parallel series of ledgers relating to branch expenses. 
 
The extent of this weekly sales and expenses data is substantial, bearing in mind that at the 
start of the its coverage Sainsbury’s had over 100 branches, rising to 255 by the outbreak of 
the second world war.  More manageable are the data contained in a series of volumes 
compiled by the company’s personnel department and ‘discovered’ in the office of a retiring 
senior personnel manager in 1986.  The three volumes span the period 1906-1964, with a few 
entries for 1965
4.  It is believed that their original purpose was to record basic data about 
store performance to inform decisions about store managers’ remuneration. For each branch  
the manager’s name, salary and annual bonus are recorded, together with basic information 
about store opening, extension and closure dates.  But, in the present context, these volumes’ 
greatest value is that they record annual average weekly sales, expenses and gross margin for 
each store, thus forming a continuous and consistent series for a period of nearly sixty years.    
 
The end of this series almost certainly corresponds with the start of computerised record-
keeping by Sainsbury’s personnel department.  As is so often still the case, electronic data 
have survived much less well than their paper-based equivalent, with the result that there are 
major gaps in the Sainsbury Archive’s collection.  But the fact that Sainsbury’s was one of 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
of the collection’s arrangement and description. 
3 Catalogue references SA/BR/21/6 15 volumes covering the period 1911-1961; SA/BL/3: 18 volumes covering 
1961-71.     4
the first British companies to use computers for business purposes had considerable benefits 
in terms of the quality and professionalism of the statistical data that was collected as well, of 
course, for the company’s commercial success.  The company’s first statistician was Bernard 
Ramm
5, who joined the company in 1949.  His appointment as the fourth non-family board 
director in 1962 was a measure both of the esteem in which he was held and of the 
importance to his department’s work.  Amongst his achievements was to earn Sainsbury’s the 
distinction of becoming the first British food retailer – the sixth British business of any kind -   
to enter the computer age.   The team that he appointed in advance of the installation of the 
Emidec 1100 computer in 1961 was part of an elite group of computer programmers and 
experts in the commercial world at that time.
6   
 
The first applications to which the new computer was put were stock control and ordering – 
based, no doubt, on the company’s experience of using Powers-Samas punched-card 
machinery for these functions.  But the scale of the investment involved and the complexity 
of the task for a company which sold around two thousand product lines - of which the 
potential for stock losses was accentuated by the proportion which were highly perishable - 
necessitated a step change in Sainsbury’s information management expertise.   Under Ramm, 
the company built up statistical expertise which included market analysis, sales forecasting, 
site assessment and work study, as well as more day-to-day functions such as financial 
accounts and payroll
7.  The survival of records from all of these areas is patchy, but the 
quality of the material which does survive is exemplary. 
 
One of the most important series of documents is the ‘Financial Reviews’ which were 
produced at each financial year end as a briefing document for directors
8.  The series is 
incomplete, but contains information about branch sales - broken down by type of store -  
costs, including central department and depot overheads and branch depreciation estimates, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 SA/EMP/2/27 (1906-20);  SA/BL/3/236 (1921-1948).  The final volume is currently uncatalogued. 
5 Sainsbury’s, The Record Years, Haggerston Press, London, 2006, pp80-81.  Ramm was also assistant editor of 
the Journal of Applied Statistics from 1956-57.  
6 Graeme Nicholls, one of Sainsbury computer programmers, later recalled how in the late 1950s the circle of 
computer experts was so small that they used to decide between themselves who would apply for each new job. 
JS Journal May 1996 p20.  
7 Another factor prompting Sainsbury’s increase in statistical expertise was the increasing requirement to 
produce data for government surveys such as the Census of Distribution and National Food Survey.  See ‘The 
Statistical Function in a Distributive Organisation’, N C Turner, The Incorporated Statistician. Vol. 4, No. 1 
(Mar., 1953), pp. 27-40 Turner was Sainsbury’s Company Secretary 1938-67. Although these requirements 
were common to other retailers, Sainsbury’s wartime experiences had brought the company into unusually close 
contact with government because of the advisory roles played by Alan Sainsbury and others.   5
data relating to the sales and profitability of each product department and a management 
commentary.  Thus they provide much of the information which latterly came to be included 
in the official Reports and Accounts, but a detail and format which appears to be 
‘unmassaged’.  These documents were regarded as being so highly confidential that each 
copy was numbered and marked with the name of the recipient. 
 
The 1960s marked the ascendancy of the fourth generation of the Sainsbury family.  John 
Sainsbury, the founders’ eldest grandson, joined the firm in 1950.  He gradually took over 
responsibility for the trading side of the business, becoming vice-chairman when his father, 
Alan Sainsbury, retired in 1967.  He succeeded his uncle as chairman two years later. 
 
John Sainsbury’s two younger brothers, Simon and Timothy, qualified respectively as an 
accountant and a chartered surveyor.  The former initially became responsible for personnel 
and finance and served as vice-chairman from 1969-79; the latter board-level responsibility 
for the company’s store development programme.  Their cousin, David Sainsbury, took a 
Cornell MBA before becoming financial controller and subsequently finance director.  Thus 
the fourth generation of the Sainsbury family was not only itself professionally well-
qualified, but also understood the importance of employing a highly-qualified and well-
informed senior management team. 
 
John Sainsbury, in particular, placed great emphasis on the value of high-quality statistical 
data as a management tool and as a mechanism for informing and motivating staff at all 
levels, particularly senior and middle management.  He initiated a biennial programme of 
management conferences and introduced ‘year end’ meetings – which soon also came to be 
supplemented with ‘interim meetings’ to explain the company’s strategy and performance as 
an adjunct to the published announcements of the company’s financial results.  These 
included a series of presentations by directors, led by John Sainsbury himself, together with 
formal ‘Q&A’ sessions and a post-meeting social gathering.  Most of John Sainsbury’s 
speeches for these presentations – although not those of other directors – survive, together 
with printed copies of the visual aids used
9.  Additionally some of the statistical department’s 
briefing papers and supporting documentation for these ‘year end’ presentations have 
survived.  Together with the Financial Reviews and, from 1969, the more informative format 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 SA/CO/5/4/1-4 
9 Catalogue refs fall into SA/CO & SA/FAM    6
of the official Annual Reports, these groups of papers complement each other to provide a 
far-reaching body of information about the company’s strategy and progress.  The sales data 
contained within these internal documents include comparisons between the performance of 
counter service and self-service stores, commentary on the progress of particular product 
departments, for example in relation to product innovation, and comparison with competitors. 
 
A complementary information source gives details of sales of individual products, together 
with retail price movements from 1963-1979
10.  I believe that these data were collected as 
part of the statistical department’s production of a ‘JS Basket’ - a selection of products sold in 
Sainsbury’s stores - for comparison with the data produced by market research agencies and 
the RPI.  The figures do not relate to the complete product range and the coverage for the 
different departments is variable, but, used in conjunction with the Financial Review data, the 
series is large enough to give insights into the evolving product range and the strategies used 
to build the sales of Sainsbury’s supermarkets during the 1960s and 70s.   
 
These datasets are extremely unusual in their quality and extent.  Unlike, for example, 
financial institutions, retailers tend to use few historical records in pursuance of their day-to-
day business activities, which is one of the main reasons why the survival of retail archives is 
patchy.  That such records have survived at Sainsbury’s is as much the result of a dynastic 
corporate culture that cherished the past as of the professional passion of successive 
archivists.  The paucity of sources, particularly hard evidence of the sales performance of 
early supermarket trading, helps to explain why this subject has been neglected.  There is 
much scope for a detailed re-examination of the whole history of multiple food retailing and 
its role in transforming on the one hand the channels by which food was distributed and on 
the other the diets and shopping patterns of ordinary people. But the remainder of this paper 
will argue that one period in particular has suffered from this neglect and that the 
development of self-service trading in the postwar period deserves recognition as a watershed 
which bore the hallmarks of a classic economic revolution.  It will show how the sales data 
outlined above have been used partially to redress this balance. 
 
Contemporaries were in no doubt about the importance of the changes which took place in 
food retailing during the third quarter of the twentieth century.
11  The postwar period 
                                                            
10 SA/BL/1/.   
11 Literature ranged from trade journals such as the Grocer and Supermarket and Self-service, practical   7
witnessed the introduction of new technologies and forms of organisation which changed the 
structure of food retailing, increased scale and alleviated the historic bottle-necks of 
traditional forms of service.  It made possible spectacular and permanent improvements in 
productivity.   
 
Self-service food retailing originated in the USA in the early twentieth century and spread 
rapidly during the interwar years.   It became associated with the sale of pre-packed branded 
goods at low prices from warehouse-style premises.  Labour costs were minimised by 
pushing the preparation and packaging that had previously been carried out by shop assistants 
onto food manufacturers, and by delegating to shoppers activities such as assembling orders 
and home delivery
12.  British retailers were aware of US developments in food retailing and 
there were a number of interwar experiments with self-service techniques.  But differences in 
the economic and social context - particularly the relative prices of land and labour, and 
lower levels of private car ownership - explain the time-lag between the introduction of self-
service techniques in Britain and America.  
 
Whereas in the US, early supermarket development was spurred by competitive pressures, in 
Britain experimentation with self-service took place within a command economy.  The 
London Co-operative Society opened its first self-service shop at Romford in 1942; many of 
the major multiples also tested the new shopping methods during the 1940s.  One of the chief 
attractions, at a time of labour shortages, was the expectation that self-service would facilitate 
improvements in labour productivity, although other features also appealed to retailers, such 
as the reorientation of product assortment towards ranges which were relatively plentiful to 
supplement supplies of rationed fresh foods.  In 1949, John Strachey, Minister for Food, 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
handbooks, e.g. Self-service Retailing, its Profitable Application to all Trade,  Ralph G Towsey, London 1964; 
Management Implications of Self-service Installations; Self-service Shop, J A Hough and F Lambert, 
Manchester, 1951; and academic studies such as Revolution in Retailing, C Fulop, Institute of Economic 
Affairs,1961; Competition for Consumers, C Fulop, IEA 1964; Productivity in Distribution, K D George 
Cambridge University Press, 1966; Productivity in the Distributive Trades, J B Jefferies, European Productivity 
Agency, 1954.  WG McClelland, who bridged the academic and business sectors in his capacity as Managing 
Director of the regional grocer Law’s Stores Ltd and the first Director of Manchester Business School, 
published extensively on the subject, e.g. ‘The Economics of the Supermarket Economic Journal, 72, pp154-70, 
Costs and Competition in Retailing, Macmillan, 1966, Studies in Retailing, Blackwell, 1963.  Governments’ 
concern with the potential of self-service for improving retail productivity was sufficiently strong to merit 
special studies on self-service as part of successive Censuses of Distribution.  See, for example, Board of Trade 
Journal - 4th Sept 1959.  Volt 177 no 3259 and The Economic Performance of Self-service in 
Europe, Henksmeier, OEEC European Productivity Agency, Paris, 1960. 
12  E.g. Anglo-American Council on Productivity, Productivity Team Report: Retailing, London, Nov 1952, p21. 
   8
announced the availability of 100 special building licences to encourage retailers to 
experiment with self-service methods.  So challenging was the postwar trading environment 
that the licences were undersubscribed.  J. Sainsbury Ltd was one of the firms which did take 
up the Minister’s offer.  Its first self-service store opened in Croydon on 26
th June 1950.  This 
converted store was sufficiently successful to encourage further experimentation and, by the 
mid 1960s, Sainsbury’s was committed to the replacement of all of its counter service 
branches. 
 
As a first step towards understanding the impact of introducing self-service methods into 
food retailing, the personnel department’s average weekly sales figures for all Sainsbury’s 
stores were analysed for the period 1947-1964. 
 
Figure 1 shows the sales for each store type adjusted for food inflation.  At the beginning of 
the period all Sainsbury’s 240 stores fell into the ‘pre-war counter service’ category, which is 
to say that they conformed to the ‘traditional’ pattern of trading in which customers were 
served by shop assistants who also weighed and wrapped the goods as required and took 
payment.  This type of store therefore forms a ‘baseline’ against which the performance of 
other stores may be measured.  The two most salient features of this store type’s performance 
are firstly sales which were below those of any of the self-service types and secondly, by the 
early 1960s, sales which were declining in real terms.  Seventeen  ‘postwar counter service’ 
stores were opened during the period under review.  These operated on similar lines to their 
predecessors.   
 
The other store types offered self-service.  Most of these were purpose-built, but seven 
former counter service stores were gutted and converted.  The six stores which were opened 
in New Towns are shown separately from the other 38 other ‘new self-service’ stores.  Sales 
in the former ‘matured’ over time as the communities which these shops served grew and, by 
the mid 1960s, matched those of other self-service stores.   The contrast with the stagnant 
performance of the counter service branches is marked, and supports the notion that the 
introduction of self-service enabled a sustained ‘take-off’ in sales. 
 
These results reinforce the conventional view that self-service increased sales per store, but 
they do not indicate the relative productivity of self-service technologies.  The key measures 
used by contemporary commentators and within the industry for comparison relate to labour   9
productivity - sales per employee - and the efficiency of retail space - sales per sq ft.   
Surviving data of staff numbers are very limited, but staff allowances in Sainsbury’s self-
service stores survive for 1958.  These make it possible to compare Sainsbury’s performance 
with other equally rare data from a 1957 OEEC survey and from the 1957 Census of 
Distribution - which was the first to elicit separate information on self-service trading.  The 
results are presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Productivity measures, Self-service and Counter Service Shops, 1958 
 
 









2 /  m
2 /employee  /checkout 
UK self-service  £12,000 116 £630 £5,700  £32,000
All Sainsbury’s self-service  £420,000 306 £1,370 £6,060  £67,400
Large* Sainsbury’s stores  £503,000 360 £1,400 £5,180  £72,000
Large* cooperative stores  £144,000 353 £410 £7,870  £36,900
Large* self-service multiples  £355,000 407 £870 £6.490  £59,900
Sources: Sainsbury’s average weekly sales data; Henksmeier, ed, The Economic Performance of Self-service in 
Europe - OEEC: EPA, 1960, pp83-98; Board of Trade Journal Vol 177 no3259, 4
th Sept 1959, p215.  *1959; 
*Self-service stores with sales areas of at least 3,000 sq ft. 
 
Sainsbury’s self-service stores achieved sales which were about 35 times the British average.  
It was more efficient than its competitors in the intensity with which it used its store space, 
but its labour was less productive than that employed by co-operatives or by other multiples.    
The discrepancy appears to have increased with store size, a factor which suggests that, since 
the adjustment of staff numbers was a variable over which management had control, this 
lower labour productivity was intentional.  Sainsbury’s sales per checkout were higher than 
those of competitors, which suggests that the additional labour was not deployed at the ‘front 
end’.  
   10
These differences are partly explicable in terms of product range
13.  Chains which 
concentrated heavily on merchandise which did not require practical preparation skills were 
better able to manage the hours of shop floor employees to suit peaks and troughs in trade.  
Skilled jobs such as butchery were less susceptible to part-time employment than shelf-filling 




This ‘snapshot’ comparison suggests that there was considerable scope for management 
decision-making in the deployment of resources.  A study which attempted to disaggregate 
the effects of labour, capital and entrepreneurship inputs was published by K D George in 
1968.
15  The capital expenditure of the 84 large retailing firms which participated in George’s 
study corresponded to around 30% of the Board of Trade’s total figure of £247 million for all 
retail firms in that year. 
 
The first three columns of Table 2 below replicate George’s computations for rates of change 
in labour productivity, capital intensity and management input by type of business for the 
period 1961-66.  The other columns show the same calculation for Sainsbury’s stores for the 
same period, for 1966-70, and for the decade as a whole.  The latter are derived from the 
series of detailed financial reviews prepared for Sainsbury’s directors over this period.   
Figures for Sainsbury’s capital investment have been estimated from information about the 
depreciation of capital assets, using bank base rates as a proxy for depreciation rates.  
 
Sainsbury’s growth in output - measured by its increase in turnover - was similar to that of 
other large grocery multiples for the first half of the decade and grew more rapidly thereafter.  
In the period covered by George’s survey, its wage bill increased by around 4% per annum in 
real terms to £8.7m by 1966.
16  Labour productivity increased in parallel, a pattern similar to 
that of other grocers, but markedly different from that of the co-operatives, who responded to 
                                                            
13 There also be differences in measurement, and in particular how part-time work was represented. 
14 Tobacco sales were reported to account for around 12% of sales in a 1962 study of two Nottingham Co-
operative stores ‘The Operation of a Self-service Store’ L A Cherriman & R Wilson, Co-operative Union 1962 
p16; Other Co-operatives  attracted even higher tobacco sales, cf  Supermarkets, Co-operative Trade Guide, 
1964, p93, assumed 20% of sales of a ‘typical’ store were tobacco.  Sainsbury’s did not sell tobacco products 
until the late 1960s.   
15Productivity and Capital Expenditure in Retailing, Cambridge University Department of Applied Economics Occasional Papers: 
16.  CUP, 1968. 
16 Following George’s methodology, Sainsbury’s wage and salary bills for 1961, 1966 and 1970 were deflated   11
stagnant sales by reducing their labour input at a rate of 1.6% per annum.  In the second half 
of the decade Sainsbury’s increased its labour input, so that although sales rose by over 9% 




Productivity and technical change 1961-70 
     Co-op  Grocers
17     All Firms
18 Sainsbury’s  Sainsbury’s
Sainsbury’s 
      1961-66 1961-66   1961-66   1961-66   1966-70   1961-70 
Changes in 
Output    0.14 7.64   5.37     7.79    9.22   8.43 
Labour  input          -1.66  4.29   2.25     3.94   7.76   5.62 
Labour  
Productivity 1.80 3.35     3.12     3.85   1.46   2.81 
Of which, due to 
changes in: 
Capital/head  1.89  1.12   1.86     4.45   -4.10   0.61 
ATOK
19   -0.09 2.23              1.26     - 0.60     5.56   2.20 
 
Sources:   K D George: Productivity and Capital Expenditure in Retailing, CUP, 1968, p29; Sainsbury’s 
Financial Reviews 1961-1970; Time, Rates of Wages and Hours of Work (HMSO, 1962, p210 & 1967, p208); C 
Feinstein National Income, Expenditure and Output, 1855-1965, CUP 1972, T141.  Productivity growth = 
changes in output – changes in input.  
 
While labour productivity is often easier to measure, its importance to economic historians is 
typically as a proxy for underlying changes in capital investment or the layout of work that 
enable the workforce to become more efficient. Increases in labour productivity during this 
period are not typically assumed to be caused by workers putting more effort in for the same 
wages. In his survey of productivity, George explicitly differentiated between the increases to 
labour productivity caused by additional capital investment and the residual, presumed to be 
caused by innovations in management and firm organisation (or what he called Applied 
Technical and Organisational Knowledge – ATOK in Table 2). Using firm-level sources, the 
equivalent data for Sainsbury’s have been calculated and so the comparison of the 
determinants of labour productivity in the grocery trades has been extended.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
to 1961 rates by an index computed from the information using the sources cited.  
17 Food multiples who responded to George’s survey.  These were: Allied Suppliers, Amos Hinton, Booth and 
Co, Clover Dairies, Cullen, Duckworth, Jas, J W Hillard, International Stores, Laws Stores, Melias, Pricerite, 
J.Sainsbury, Tesco Stores, Victor Value, F J Wallis, Wrenson.  
18 i.e. the 84 large retailing firms who responded to George’s survey.     
19 Applied Technical and Organisational Knowledge (ATOK) ie entrepreneurship =(O-L)-α(C-L), where O is 
the real annual cumulative percentage change in output, measured by sales, L is the real annual cumulative 
change in labour input, measured by wages, and C is the real annual cumulative change in capital investment.  
The factor α is the share of profits in net output which, since Sainsbury’s were increasing capital and labour   12
 
Sainsbury’s annual percentage increase in capital per worker during the period covered by 
George’s survey was about four times that of the ‘Grocers’ category and twice that of Co-
operatives.  As a result, the residual productivity change attributable to Sainsbury’s 
management expertise, ‘ATOK’, was virtually zero, as was also the case with the co-
operatives.  However, while Sainsbury’s ATOK was, in this period, negligible because the 
company was increasing its labour and capital inputs in parallel, the Co-operatives appear to 
have been substituting capital for labour.  Since the labour input is measured by wages, this 
could have been either a matter of reducing actual staff numbers, or it may have been the 
result of lower average wages as a result of ‘de-skilling’.  In either case, the contrast between 
these two approaches is an important indicator of the difference in the trading practices of 
each type of business.  It is noteworthy that while Sainsbury’s was amongst the most 
successful chains in this period, the Co-operatives were steadily losing market share. 
 
From 1966 onwards, the amount of capital invested per worker by Sainsbury’s fell sharply.  
This picture of diminishing capital per worker accords what we know of Sainsbury’s 
investment patterns over this period.  The most important of these was the switch from 
counter service to self-service.  At the end of the 1961 financial year, 229 of Sainsbury’s 260 
stores operated on counter service lines.  Over the course of the early 1960s, this situation 
gradually began to change, but by 1966 two-thirds of the firm’s shops still offered counter 
service.  Considerable sums were spent on refitting these stores during the immediate postwar 
period, for example through the addition of cold stores, refrigerated cabinets, mechanical 
handling equipment and new fascias.  Early self-service stores were similarly capital 
intensive in their requirements for these facilities.  After 1966 Sainsbury’s became committed 
to opening large self-service shops throughout its trading area, and the rate of closure of 
counter service shops accelerated: 63 of these shops closed in the second half of the decade, 
against 30 in the previous five years.  The average sales area of new self-service stores – 
which in 1960 had been 4,700 sq ft – increased from 6,483 sq ft in 1966 to 10,215 sq ft in 
1970.  Their capital intensity decreased partly through the use of standardised shopfittings 
and construction methods and partly because proportionately less space was devoted to 
product ranges with required capital-intensive refrigeration.  Over the decade, the 
depreciation data suggest that the amount of capital invested per square foot of sales area fell 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
inputs roughly in parallel, is here assumed to be equal to 1.   13
from around £30 to less than £15 per sq ft.  In larger stores self-service was not, therefore, a 
more capital intensive form of distribution than counter service, because the latter had 
themselves become highly capital intensive and because by the late 1960s new supermarkets 
were becoming more efficient in their use of capital. 
 
The picture with regard to labour costs is complex.  Over the course of the 1960s wages as a 
percentage of sales remained at between 7 and 8 per cent.  This consistency, however, masks 
important changes in working practices in self-service stores, for example an increase in the 
use of - typically female - part-time workers whose hours could be scheduled to match 
customer flows and a ‘flatter’ management structure.  These cost-reducing trends were, 
however, offset by wage inflation, reduced working hours for full-time staff, and strong 
concerns about the dilution of the ‘quality’ of the work force -  factors which applied to all 
stores.  Thus while self-service stores’ wage costs remained stable, those of counter service 
stores had increased, by 1970, to over ten per cent of sales. 
 
Together, these factors suggest that self-service was as much a marketing innovation as a 
‘technological’ one.  While figure 1 confirms that self-service stores generated significantly 
higher sales than counter service shops and table 1 demonstrates that Sainsbury’s was 
amongst the industry’s most successful exponents of the new shopping methods, table 2 
implies that this success was not the result of exceptional investment in either new machinery 
or novel working patterns.  Rather, it is suggested, Sainsbury’s success was based on factors 
such as store design, layout, better-trained staff and product assortment, which together led to 
a higher footfall and more purchases per visit.  This conclusion is supported by the 
superiority of Sainsbury’s sales per square foot, per checkout and per customer.   
 
The value of the records of sales by departments given in the Financial Reviews, the 
statistical department’s year-end working papers and the ring binders of individual product 
sales make it possible to ‘unpack’ aspects of these marketing changes.  Over the period 
covered by this study, the product range increased from less than 1,000 products in 1950 to 
around 4,000 product lines in 1970.  Proportionately there was a shift away from meat and 
dairy produce – Sainsbury’s traditional strengths – towards groceries and other non-
perishables such as non-foods, beers, wines and spirits.  These increased from 20% of sales in 
1960 to nearly 40% by 1970.  The growth in importance of these products also helps to 
explain the declining rate of Sainsbury’s capital investment because they did not require   14
refrigeration.  But perishable products continued to form an important part of Sainsbury’s 
trade, helping to explain the company’s high sales per sq ft, because these products were 
relatively expensive per item.  Comparison with the co-operatives’ pattern of trade, which 
was heavily biased towards packaged groceries at the expense of fresh food highlights the 
difference between each organisation’s style of trade.
20 Another source confirms this contrast: 
comparing the store layout diagrams for individual branch openings issued by different 
supermarket operators to help their customers find their way around new stores demonstrates 
that Sainsbury’s devoted a much greater proportion of its sales space to fresh products – 
especially fresh and cooked meats and dairy produce – than either the co-operatives or other 
multiple supermarket companies, and less to packaged groceries and cooked meats.  Over 
time we also see at Sainsbury’s a greater increase in space devoted to ‘new’ departments such 
as greengrocery, bakery, off-licence and frozen foods, which were  departments which 
carried higher profit margins than the branded groceries which formed the bulk of 
competitors’ trade.  On average, these products contributed more to profits than to sales, thus 
‘earning’ their increased sales space.    
 
In other words, Sainsbury’s style of trading, which relied on higher levels of investment in 
labour and capital-intensive shopfittings, particularly refrigeration, although contrary to 
received orthodoxy about the chief benefit of supermarket trading being its capacity to 
substitute ‘low-tech’ capital (eg simple shelving units, shopping trolleys and checkouts) for 
labour, was perfectly rational in economise on the light of the company’s reputation for high-
quality fresh foods.  Indeed, one of its most notable product innovations, the collaboration 
with poultry farmers and processors to mass-produce and market frozen ‘broiler’ chickens 
was a spectacular example of the company’s capacity to build sales by ‘de-seasonalising’ a 
product for which sales had hitherto been almost exclusively restricted to Christmas and 
Easter, even though this also meant increasing the use of expensive refrigeration plant 
throughout the distribution chain
21.  As with the company’s later role in pioneering the self-
service sale of beers, wines and spirits – another product group for which it created a year-
round market from a highly seasonal one -  Sainsbury’s strategy was to expand the concept of 
                                                            
20 The ‘typical’ co-operative store used to illustrate the Co-operative Union Trade Guide Supermarkets (Co-
operative Union, 1964) p93, for example, assumed 38% grocery sales,  15% provisions and only 10% meat.  See 
‘The Operation of a Self-service Store’ L A Cherriman & R Wilson, Co-operative Union 1962 p16. 
21 ‘The Chicken, the Factory Farm and the Supermarket: the Industrialization of Poultry Farming in Britain and 
the United States, 1950-1980’ Andrew Godley and Bridget Williams, in Roger Horowitz  and Warren Belasco 
eds, Food Chains, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008,    15
supermarket trading – high turnover at competitive prices – into product areas not generally 
associated with these methods. 
 
These comparisons have concentrated on the supply side of the equation.  But in retailing the 
‘primacy of the customer’ is paramount.  The significance of Sainsbury’s bias towards high 
value-added lines like perishable goods and wines was that it enabled the company to appeal 
to a wider customer base than was typically the case.  According to the statistical 
department’s notes for the 1971 year end presentation, 44% of its shoppers at that date were 
AB or C1s, as against 35% of the population as a whole.  There was a slight bias towards the 
35-54 age group and away from shoppers under 25.  Studies published by the European 
Productivity Agency and the British Market Research Bureau
22 found that self-service 
generally appealed chiefly to younger working-class housewives.  As we would expect from 
this customer profile, Sainsbury’s customers typically spent more than those who shopped 
elsewhere.   Sainsbury’s statistical department calculated the average expenditure per 
customer visit in the company’s supermarkets in 1969 to be £1.10s (£1.50) compared with a 
national average of 17/- (85p). 
 
This overview suggests that the early development of self-service food retailing bore the 
hallmarks of a classic economic ‘revolution’ in terms of its capacity to generate sustained 
economic growth in a stagnant sector through the use of factory-style forms of organisation, 
particularly in relation to labour.  It also demonstrates that Sainsbury’s had a distinctive style 
of trading which was highly successful both in its use of retail space and in its appeal to high-
spending customers.  Moreover, by focusing on a wide range of sales figures as the central 
measure of performance, it allows us to form a deepening picture of the complexity of 
Sainsbury’s style of trade and of its ascendancy as the most successful supermarket company 
of the 1980s and early 1990s.   
 
The impact of the organisational changes and investment of the 1960s was only just 
beginning to be felt by the end of the period covered by this study.  What we see in 1970 is a 
business poised on the point of take-off.  But these findings have wider implications.  The 
experimentation carried out by British food retailers during the postwar period produced a 
variety of formats, some of which owed more than others to US or French influences.  But it 
                                                            
22The Consumer’s Food-buying Habits, European Productivity Agency, OEEC, Paris,  1958; Shopping in 
Suburbia, British Market Research Bureau, London, 1961   16
was the Sainsbury’s format – centred around the quality of its fresh food offering, and on 
customer service levels which required significantly higher levels of staffing than other 
models – which was the most successful and hence became the norm for British supermarkets 
during the 1980s.  It was the model which competitors emulated and upon which in recent 
years Tesco, in particular, has expanded.  The rich vein of sales data contained in the 
Sainsbury Archive therefore holds the clue not just to that company’s success, but to the 
progress of one of Britain’s most dynamic sectors over the course of the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries.   17
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